This paper explores the way in which the location of science as a social practice has changed in the UK during the last two decades.
INTRODUCTION
The practices of science and of accounting are human activities conducted by elites with modernist pretensions to objectivity. Both are context-dependent epistemic practices producing recognised knowledge that affects social, political and economic spheres.
The topical relevance of science is demonstrated by recent UK controversies such as animal testing, GM food crops, the dumping of the Brent Spar and genetic sciences. The aim of this paper is to theorise these repeated controversies with specific reference to the role of accounting. In particular, we document and explore the role of accounting in the changing nature and location of science as a social practice in the UK during the last two decades.
Our central thesis is that the practice of science in the UK has undergone a fundamental shift of socio-economic location in the last two decades. Until comparatively recently, nearly all science was practised within "the sphere of human activities" identified as the independent "Republic of Science" by Dasgupta and David (1994, p487) . Since the 1960s, they argue, this Republic has been besieged by interventionist national science policies driven by the desire to limit the less publicly acceptable aspects of science and, perhaps more importantly, to curb the budgets of scientists and to direct their work towards objectives with better economic paybacks.
These interventions have resulted in the actual or virtual relocation of science from its discrete "Republic" to positions firmly within or under the hegemonic control of the public and private sectors. This relocation was achieved through the commodification of the knowledge product of science. Regimes of accounting and financial control, we argue, have been central to that process of commodification.
This relocation has fundamentally altered the social practice of science, disrupting the traditional social contract between scientists and the public under which science produced open, codifiable and trusted knowledge. This disruption has significantly contributed to the controversies that so frequently feature in the mass media and to Because science is a social practice, science knowledge products cannot exist independently from the processes that make and shape them. If science knowledge production embodies commodification, we reason, then the resulting knowledge product will reflect that commodification. Law and Akrich (1994) demonstrated how the commercialisation of scientific "machines" such as a particle accelerator may shape the resulting knowledge products.
The knowledge product of professional accounting practice has always been a commodity. For instance, companies obtain institutional and economic capital by acquiring through payment an audit certificate. The knowledge accountants produce is arguably subject to subtle controls and influences as a result of it being so commodified: such arguments lie at the heart of much debate about corporate governance in the UK. Under a traditional model, scientific knowledge (in fundamental distinction from technology) is not commodified. By the process of "innovation" knowledge flows from the (independent) realm of science to the world of (commercial) technological development and exploitation. As Rose and Rose (1969) out it:
"…innovation depends on a process whereby science continuously transforms and informs technology" (p8).
Of course, not all science leads demonstrably, either in the short or long term, to technological outputs. Nor is it always possible to discern at the outset which scientific knowledge products will prove useful in the development of technology. Implicit here is a division of labour between scientists and technologists. Recent trends indicate a breakdown in this traditional divide as much scientific activity is commercialised (i.e. relocated) (Stewart, 1999) . Nelson and Rosenberg (1994) argue that the failure to maintain this division of labour (and therefore spheres of activity) will result in the neglect of fundamental science, to the general detriment. It follows that any commodification of the scientific knowledge product will fundamentally change the very nature of what science is. That such a change has occurred is a central theme of this paper.
Some models: knowledge commodities, ownership and stakeholders
The production and utilisation of scientific knowledge occurs in a context peopled by scientists and stakeholders (comprising "the public", government and industry). We propose two models-the "traditional" and the "new", of how these actors interact. Under this social contract model, the practice of science is a discrete, independent and objective. Its function is to produce codifiable open knowledge that might be The public Industry and commerce Science Government economically useful but could equally have some general, civilising, effect or be useful in government. In return for this knowledge, scientists receive specific rewards unrelated to the economic usefulness of the knowledge: "Science is… maintained by a value system which emphasises universality and disciplinary communism and a reward system whereby the scientist, in return for the gift of knowledge to his (sic) readers, is accorded status and recognition" (Rose and Rose, 1969, p8) .
The traditional model
" [Scientists' rewards for] the production of original and demonstrably reliable knowledge [are] publications, tenure and recognition by the elaborate system of honours that the profession has constructed for itself" (Anderson, 2000) .
The exploitation of scientific knowledge for commercial benefit takes place away from the realm of science. Much of the writing on science and science policy from the 1850's to the 1980's praised Britain's scientific knowledge production whilst bemoaning the inability of "industry" utilise that knowledge by turning it into profitable technology through innovation (see, for example, Wiener, 1981) .
In such a model, government both accepts a responsibility for funding science and derives useful knowledge from it. Scientific knowledge products are public or merit goods. This traditional model implies a tacit and trust-based social contract between scientists as practitioners and the wider society as users and/or stakeholders. It follows that then that public understanding or governance of science consists of little more than a knowledge and appreciation of the independent, objective and potentially useful knowledge production work of scientists. Figure The public, sans science
The new model of science
We argue here that the commodification of scientific knowledge has virtually or actually relocated the practice of science to within either the public or the private sectors. The production of open and codifiable knowledge wanes as scientific knowledge (and the knowledge production process) is transformed into a commodity owned and controlled by those seeking to exploit it. Scientists' rewards are no longer social status and position, but rather are financial and commensurate with the economic usefulness of their knowledge.
This relocation of science has disrupted the pre-existing social contract between science and the public, with the latter left with little or no access to science and its knowledge product. In turn, the public comes to view science with greater suspicion and less trust. No matter how it tries, science now has difficulties in presenting itself as a neutral, benign and value-free process.
The rest of this paper charts the development of the traditional model of science in the UK up to 1979 and that of the new model since then, explaining the role of accounting. Section Three documents the development of the traditional model. Section Four examines the process of transition since 1979 by reference to the unfolding story in public laboratories and universities. Section Five presents a series of case studies which demonstrate how the commodification of scientific knowledge has led to the disruption of the traditional social contract in science. This is followed by some conclusions.
TRADITIONAL SCIENCE

A short history to 1945
The history of the development of science under the traditional model has two themes. These are: the development of science as an independent activity and, making this possible, significant amounts of public and charitable financial support.
The European Renaissance, characterised as it was by Modernist thinking, prompted the development of science as a distinct practice. Science was usually a discrete activity with its own mores, culture and discipline. It was a largely individual pursuit of cultivated individuals. Lacking any institutional basis, individual scientists from the Renaissance until well into the industrial revolution, were financed and protected by the patronage of the church, governments, universities or the aristocracy. As industrial capitalism began to take root in the 16 th and 17 th centuries so science became more organised. The need for the growing number of scientists to communicate with each other led to the establishment of some 220 scientific societies by 1790 (Rose and Rose, 1969) . As social organisation shifted and coalesced around new forms in this time of turmoil, so the new scientific organisations had to seek new patrons. They did so most often with governments, who were generally ready to assist. Britain's Royal Society was founded in 1662, with Royal patronage. At the same time, as society embraced modernism, so the study of science took firm root in the ancient universities. These new organisations and sites of scientific practice were not part of the developing industries. State support was given because the benefits of science were readily apparent to governments: in the newly industrialising world scientific knowledge implied technological development that meant success in developing capitalism. For instance, the Royal Society was praised by King Charles I for its efforts to solve the problem of the measurement of longitude: a factor crucial to British supremacy in merchanting activities on the high seas (Sobel, 1996) .
Throughout the nineteenth century ,science increasingly sought to assert itself as an organised social activity and to define its role in society. But whilst scientists generally worked with industry, they did not work within it. Many new institutes and colleges were created. At this time science came to be seen by governments as an essential pre-cursor to the development and maintenance of Britain's industrial preeminence: a position science was to hold until well into the 20 th century. The separation between science and industry is evident from these early years. For instance:
"Where state laboratories could not be built, economic rationalisation, mergers and the inexorable trend towards monopoly capitalism at last began to generate firms which were big enough to do so themselves. Lever Brothers at Port Sunlight set up a laboratory in 1889 for dealing with some of the theoretical problems raised by soaps and emulsions, whilst a merger of fortyeight chemical firms in Scotland, Tyneside and Lancashire produced the United Alkali Company and resulted in 1892 in the establishment of a central research analytical laboratory with six chemists. But the quality of these industrial scientists was still poor, so that the results… were still suspect" (Rose and Rose, 1969, p35) .
The importance attached to science is reflected in the extent of government financial support for the activity. However, this financial support was not as generous as that given to German scientists. By 1914 the UK lagged behind her continental industrial competitors and military adversaries and received a rude awakening during the First World War. The crisis generated by the sudden awareness of Britain's relative weakness in vital war technologies such as explosives, dyes and lens making led to a rapid increase in government funding of science.
In 1915 the government established the Haldane Committee to distribute funds for scientific research or, more specifically, "to develop and organise the knowledge required for the application of science to industry" (DES, 1981) . Eventually, Haldane's committee developed into the Department for Scientific and Industrial Research with a brief "to promote and organise science research with the view especially to its application to industry and trade" (DSIR, 1962) . The DSIR attempted to stimulate industrially based scientific research by promoting and subsidising the formation of research associations where firms would pool resources and share scientific results to the mutual benefit of all. As early as 1920, the eminent scientist Sir Frederick Soddy was criticising the public subsidy of private gain. Nor were the research associations the success envisaged. Manufacturers entertained mutual suspicions of each other and the envisaged financial independence from government funds never materialised (Rose and Rose, 1969) .
The DSIR became the chosen vehicle for government sponsorship of science in the inter-war years. It began to acquire responsibility for a number of existing laboratories and for setting up new ones. Reflecting its wartime origins, the Department had a penchant for encouraging research that aided military competencies, but failed to promote much funding of the universities for the training of scientists.
In the inter-war years, scientists became increasingly vocal in their socialism and in their own professional organisation through unions such as the Association of Scientific Workers. This was no part of the disciplined labour force of the factories. Yet, such politicisation was not welcomed by all. AV Hill, the distinguished biophysicist said at the time:
"I should not condemn men for studying human diet, but the motive should be the discerning of scientific fact, not the demonstration that the British working class is underfed… A reputation gained by scientific achievement, and the immunity accorded to scientific pursuits, should not be lightly used to extort consideration in other respects" (Quoted in Rose and Rose, 1969, p55) By the outbreak of war in 1939 Britain was in a much stronger position than in 1914 ready to fight what has often been described as the "Scientists War". Much of the scientific work done during the war promoted British scientific and technological developments afterwards, further enhancing the general regard for science. For instance, the mathematician Turing's work at Bletchley Park on the German code machine Enigma laid the basis for his later work at the University of Manchester in building the first electronic computer.
Post 1945: a new era of funding
The post war period can be characterised by a three stage argument:
Institutional reforms and increased funding
Implies
An economic rationale for government funding of science
Absence of accounting controls
We trace that argument here, looking first at the institutional and funding reforms.
The close association between science and war performance helped to cement the relationship between science, government and society. In 1945 the UK was left with an appreciation of the value of scientific knowledge, a plethora of government committees and councils with responsibility for science policy. Thus the war reinforced the distinct institutional character of British science (Stewart, 1999) .
This experience also helped secure further government funds and the UK soon had an ever-expanding state science budget (Stewart, 1999) . Government support for science found voice in government funding of laboratories and universities and in the subsidy of projects with industry. Civil science spending rose five-fold between 1945 and 1950, from £6.5m to £30m. The formation of the National Research and Development Corporation in 1949 marked one of the first of many attempts by successive post-war governments to promote linkages between scientific research and prospective industrial end-users of the knowledge product (DES, 1981) . None of these efforts can be classed as great successes.
Under the Conservatives from 1951 to 1964 science received only distracted governmental interest, but continued to be generously funded, especially in defence related areas. The work of the DSIR was codified in law 1956, including an emphasis on university research and its role in the advancement of trade and industry (DSIR, 1962) . Science however remained a discrete activity with little integration with the processes of technological development.
From 1961 to 1964, scientists began to work closely with the Labour Party, then in Opposition, to address what were seen as critical issues. They concluded that Britain had a messy science policy and infrastructure and that there was a parlous slippage between scientific knowledge production and its eventual exploitation. The perceived solution was a government generated scientific revolution, with government activiely promoting increased technological development in industry. Science was highlighted as the modernising force of socialism at the heart of Labour's 1964 campaign, and they returned to power. Support for independent science lay at the heart of a desire to modernise Britain's ailing industries and thus ensure economic development (Rose and Rose, 1969) .
In fact, the intercession of fiscal crises meant that stringent cuts were sought in the escalating science budgets in the remainder of the sixties. Prime Minister Wilson's white heat of the technological revolution never achieved notable results in terms of industrial regeneration but did involve significant public expenditure. Throughout the seventies, successive governments failed to achieve the desired level of synergy between science and industry. Whilst substantial amounts of public finance went to support so-called "Big" (i.e. expensive) science, the decline of British industry continued unabated.
Turning to the second stage of our argument, the period from 1945 to 1979 is marked by a reverence for science and a commitment to its public support through government laboratories, universities and publicly funded projects with industry. A new rhetoric justified a largely state driven supply and allocation of economic resources for science (Nelson, 1959; Arrow,1962) . These arguments stressed that the high degree of uncertainty attached to the economic payoffs of fundamental scientific research. Allied to this, the rents from such scientific work are difficult to establish and defend because of the open nature of science as a social practice. This led to the conclusion that science is subject to market failure: markets cannot efficiently allocate resources because of the mismatch between social and private returns (Dasgupta and David, 1994) . Such economic analyses provided a rationale for government funding of science from . Of course, up until 1979 most science was a product of a particular set of social circumstances and decisions that led to it occupying an independent and discrete social location. As such, it was not part of the market economy and therefore it is of little surprise that a classical economic argument should find it market dysfunctional.
Turning to the third stage of our argument, this economic/market reasoning reflected and reinforced a prevalent ideology that science expenditure could not be controlled in quite the same ways as other activities. For instance:
"Research, more especially basic research, is often a gamble. The working out of imaginative ideas, sometimes on the basis of slight clues, or perhaps just intuition, may lead to whole new fields of knowledge, or to nothing. On the other hand, it is contrary to custom and tradition to encourage speculation with public money, in view of the very proper requirement of answerability to Parliament, and yet it is at the early uncertain stages of research that help is most necessary and most valuable." (DSIR, 1962, p129) .
Whilst science was becoming inordinately more expensive, no processes or techniques appeared to exist in government to control or monitor spending. Rose and Rose (1969) describe how one 1950's government committee on the management and control of R&D concluded that: "some research projects could not be justified and that Directors of research establishments should consider carefully before embarking upon them, and should ensure that a rough timetable of progress should be maintained. When it is considered that the period covered by this committee included such scandals in the administration of defence research as the £100 million lost on the Blue Streak [a rocket] following a six-fold escalation in estimated costs the propriety of these delicate conclusions may well be pondered". (p84).
There were sporadic efforts to impose control. In 1968 the Fulton Committee (Cmnd 3638) recommended that executive agencies be set up for certain government functions and that they should have:
"clear objectives and their performance should be judged by their results… Wherever measures of achievement can be established in quantitative or financial terms, and individuals held responsible for outputs and costs, accountable units should be set up" (Cmnd 3638).
Lord Rothschild, head of the Central Policy Review Staff proposed in 1971 that applied scientific research should be governed by a customer-contractor principle in which "the customer says what he (sic) wants; the contractor does it (if he can); and the customer pays" (Cmnd, 4814) . This led to a limited number of grants to research laboratories being awarded on the basis of bidding for defined purposes rather than being allocated as undifferentiated block grants. However, for the most part, the government research establishments continued to receive funds in ways that was not closely monitored and with the laboratory defining much of the work to be done (Boden et al, 1998) . These rather loose regimes of control were to remain in place until the 1980s.
TRANSFORMATIONS IN SCIENCE
Since 1979, UK science and scientists have been marked by a transformation in their location and nature. Accounting technology has played an important part in this transformation, in a reversal of the model dominant from 1945-79:
Deployment of accounting controls
Generates
An economic rationale for marketised and commodified science
Institutional reforms
Since 1979, UK publicly funded science has been caught up in a wave of public sector reform grounded, initially at least, in neo-classical liberal economics. For the reformers, the perceived relative efficiency of the private market as compared with the state meant that the latter should be shrunk and privatised as far as was possible. For that which remained, the aim was to emulate private sector practices in a systematic pursuit of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. This new public administration paradigm is known as New Public Management (Hood, 1990) .
NPM is a generic and loosely defined term. It frequently embodies downsizing the state, cost-cutting, marketisation and competition. This is achieved by the devolution of executive functions to quasi-autonomous agencies and a commitment to customercontractor and other quasi-commercial policy-making and management principles. Organisations are viewed as a chain of low-trust principal/agent relationships with the disaggregation of separable functions into quasi-contractual or quasi-market forms. Public sector providers are 'deconcentrated', allowing users more scope to exit, thereby ostensibly promoting competition (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994) .
NPM relies on accounting technologies to drive through and sustain marketisation and privatisation. Accounting techniques are deployed for control and accountability within reformed public sector organisations. Accounting is central to the contracting process, to the development of customer-contractor relationships, to the pricing of assets and businesses, and to internal management control (for instance through key targets and performance indicators).
These reforms have had a significant effect on government funded science. As accounting and business efficiency became the dominant discourses in government, so the pre-existing argument that science could not be part of a market was undermined.
This transformation has taken place in two distinct realms: in the public sector laboratories and in the universities. We now look at each of these in turn.
Government research establishments
The UK had a long-established comprehensive network of government scientific laboratories by 1979. These did work for and provided support to a variety of government and industry/public stakeholders, and undertook a highly diverse range of science and technology activities (Boden et al, 1998) .
As this time, these establishments produced non-commodified knowledge. For some the only "customer" for the work of the establishment was the host government department, either using the knowledge product for its own purposes or acting as a proxy customer for the public. Other establishments provided services used by industry or other non-Whitehall users. For the most part, the establishments took their state grants and produced research that the government, the public or other users might or might not use.
The NPM-driven introduction of accounting controls changed the way in which science was perceived, especially with regard to its market characteristics. In turn, this led to the virtual or actual relocation of these establishments in the private sector or in a marketised part of the public sector.
The first NPM reforms to affect science were the general administrative accounting reforms introduced following the Conservative victory in 1979. These were MINIS (the ministerial information system) and a commitment to reducing the size of government in line with the Pliatsky Report (Cmnd 7797). In 1982 the Financial Management Initiative emphasised the delegation of budgetary responsibility and focused attention on systems for identifying and managing expenditure.
Because of their relatively small budgets, government research establishments did not receive detailed attention until 1987, when the Next Steps Initiative prompted the identification of those parts of government that could be turned into executive agencies. Under such arrangements, the agency is given greater autonomy but is also subject to more rigorous performance and financial measures and controls. Executive agencies are set up under a framework document that provides a contractual basis for the relationship with government.
This policy was pursued vigorously by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Defence-two of the biggest science spenders. At the same time, pressures for competitive tendering for funds increased and the era was marked by the widespread introduction of evaluative performance measures. By 1992 some 15 government research establishments had become executive agencies, receiving their funding on a customer-contractor basis, with some also obliged to seek work in the private sector market .
Government research establishments used to receive grant monies from their host department and were largely unaccountable for their outcomes. Under agency status, the budget holders are policy makers within the department and the agency must tender for specific contracts to undertake specific work. That work is subject to performance indicators, key targets, milestones and all the other paraphanalia of NPM accounting control. As a result, departments who were end-users had enhanced power and influence. The knowledge produced by establishments is thus commodified: it is specified, bought, monitored and evaluated by the contractor in return for payment.
There had therefore been an increasing deployment of accounting controls in the government research establishments. These new controls led imperceptibly to changes in the way in which science was perceived. In 1988 the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser in the Cabinet Office, Sir John Fairclough, set out the principle that public spending on R&D should be strictly limited to that which was far from the development of marketable products or processes. "Near-market" scientific knowledge production, it was stressed, should be organised and funded by industry. The government would be left with the residual task where the market would "fail to operate to produce maximum benefits to the economy as a whole" (Wilkie, 1991) . Thus, there was a retreat from the traditional governmental role of supporting (but not particularly controlling) the generation of scientific knowledge as a public good to provide a knowledge fund on which industry could draw.
Even for the non near-market work that was to remain in the public sector, Fairclough reiterated the customer-contractor principle under which providers would compete for public R&D funds, thus initiating an internal market (Levene and Stewart, 1993) as greater accounting and accountability controls were exercised over publicly funded scientific activity to ensure that it had a clear "customer".
This change in thinking about science led to further attempts at fundamental institutional reform. Following Next Steps, the government turned its attention to the privatisation of as much of its science capacity as possible. Three specific review exercises were undertaken between 1992 and 1997. First, was the Review of Allocation, Management and Use of Government Expenditure on Science and Technology (Levene and Stewart, 1993) . Second, was the Multi-Departmental Scrutiny of Public Sector Research Establishments, conducted in 1994 by a multidepartmental team attached to the Efficiency Unit. Third, were a series of Prior Options Reviews of those organisations within the Scrutiny that had not already been privatised. These Reviews being announced in late September 1995 and performed in three tranches, all initially due for completion in 1996, and actually completed in early 1997. In a further round, some of the establishments examined in the first tranche of Prior Options Reviews were referred to yet another review.
The result of the privatisation process has been a range of new organisational forms for many government research establishments . These include government-owned/contractor operated businesses, companies limited by guarantee and regular trade sales as equity companies (some by management buy-out).
Whatever the form, these establishments are now outside government to a significant extent. This actual relocation of the scientific knowledge production process has great implications for ownership, control, governance and accountability. The science practised by these organisations is now directly subject to commercial pressures and controls.
In summary, the work of the government research establishments has either been privatised or marketised, with the consequent commodification of the knowledge product. This may well have been disruptive to the social contract that exists between scientists and the stakeholders of science. For instance, some scientific work is policy sensitive, requiring close and high-trust relationships with Whitehall policy makers. The location of scientific or technical personnel within government may facilitate access to policy makers, yet such relationships have now largely been lost. It is too early to discern the consequences of this, but there has been speculation that this disruption caused problems during the BSE crisis.
Some work, either because of policy implications or because of statutory duties, engenders a requirement for perceived and actual impartiality. Yet commercial imperatives and budgetary control may influence an organisation to concentrate on one form of work or area of research at the expense of another, or to prioritise one set of interests over another. Yet other work is undertaken in the wider public interest. And Whitehall undertakes some work as a proxy customer for wider commercial interests. A few establishments operate facilities or maintain knowledge bases that are important to competitive national (rather than private) advantage. This work is now provided on contract to government: creating an expectation that government perceives the need for it and that it will continue funding it and making it freely available.
The universities
In the universities, greater reliance is now placed than ever before on corporate sponsorship of scientific endeavours and enhanced linkages between universities and industry through media such as science parks.
The pattern of development of science in UK universities in recent years in many ways mirrors that in the US. Until the 1920s, academic research in the US was closely linked to practical problem solving in the industry. After that, it gradually moved towards what is known as 'basic research'. Particularly, after the Second World War, the nature of university research changed from short-term practical problem solving to long-term basic research. Before Second World War, the US government provided little for university research. The war changed this and after the war government, funding became the main source for academic research (Nathan and Rosenberg, 1994) . This trend was equally visible in the UK as well.
In the early 1980s there have been arguments, particularly in the US, that academic research was not meeting the requirements of the industry and it affected the competitiveness of the industry (the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, 1980) . This led to demands that universities should work closer with industry and their research should meet their needs. These arguments started as result of general decline in the competitiveness of the Western countries in general and the US in particular. From the government perspective, the policy makers encouraged closer relationship between the university research and the industry for two reasons. First, they wanted to see an increase in the economic pay off from academic research; and second they wanted to reduce the government funding of university research and see increasing industry investment in the university research. There were concerns initially among the academics that such changes in funding of university research might harm the academic independence and knowledge generation in the public domain in the long run. However, most academics gradually were won over by the economic rationale put forward by the protagonists of closer university-industry research relationship. Increasingly, universities started looking towards the industry to fund their research. This led to a paradigm shift in university research, that is, redefining basic and applied research as complementary and not treating them as dichotomous. This trend soon spread to other Western countries (see for example, Schimank, 1988; Van Dierdonck, Debackere, and Engelen, 1990 ). In the UK, the emphasis was "getting value for money from …investment in science" and the government decided to withdraw from "near market research", that is, the research "whose objective is the development of a specific product or process for commercial sale or use…. Industry can judge the requirements of the market far better than the Government, and such research should be its responsibility." (Baker, 1989 ).
In the 1980s and 1990s, universities were increasingly forced to seek industry funding, because of reduced government funding and other budgetary pressures. There has been significant increase in the academic research funded by the industry. For example, in the US, in 1993 the industry funding to the academic research was about $1.5 billion that was more than triple the amount of funding in 1984 (Mansfield and Lee, 1996) . By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the argument grew stronger that the universities should look to industry to generate larger share of their research funding. In 1986, a study showed that 97 per cent of the 200 universities surveyed had plans to make structural and programmatic changes in order to get industry support . The attitude of academics appears to have changed over the years. For example, in the US, while 55 per cent of academics in the 1980s thought that they would have considered user-oriented (pre-commercialization) research as appropriate in the universities, about 72 per cent in the 1990s considered such research as appropriate.
ii Evidence suggests that this shift in attitude occurred mainly due to changes in the nature of funding for basic research, that is, shrinking government funding and increasing industry funding. The involvement of industry in the university research occurred in many forms. This included university-industry research centres, faculty consulting for the industry, providing startup assistance to new-technology based firms, and equity holding in companies based on university research.
While major shift started towards increasingly close university-industry collaboration, serious concerns were raised by some about the detrimental influence of such shift on traditional academic freedom (e.g. Dimancescu and Botkin, 1986; Kenney, 1986; and Roy and Shapley, 1985) . Some feared that even a marginal shift in the funding structure (between the government and industry) could lead to significant organisational reorientation of university research (Dooris, 1989) . Initially, it appears that many of the academics expected that the increased industrial funding would not change the orientation of the university research. Soon, it became clear that it would not be 'business as usual'. The government programmes "started insisting upon significant industry involvement in the processes by research funds get allocated, and therefore influence over the composition and nature of academic research: "Furthermore, a significant section of academics started strongly supporting close ties with industry through more industry funding and they "are quite eager to reorient their work to make it more commercially relevant and rewarding." (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994) ." However, studies have shown that while majority of academics agreed that universities should commercialize their research, many were concerned about the "potentially corrosive influence" of 'privatisation of academic research' in choosing the research agenda. There have been increasing concerns over the impact of deep involvement with industry through mechanisms such as startup assistance and equity investment on academic freedom, long-term research and academic integrity. There was evidence even in the 1980s that close university-industry collaboration could influence academic agenda setting.
For example, studies in the field of biotechnology have shown that "interests of the biotechnology industry are actually shaping the research direction of those involved." . Also there were some evidence that suggested that pressure for short-term research have made it difficult to apply scientific checks and balances resulting in 'sloppy science ' (lee, 1996) . Also there were some evidence which suggested that publications of academics that were involved closely with industry were significantly fewer compared to publications reported by academics who did not receive industry funding. Furthermore, there was evidence that close relationship with industry could delay publication of results, as firms tend to attach some restrictions and try to protect the proprietary value of the research they sponsor. For example, a study revealed that "over a third of the students and fellows receiving training grants or scholarships from industry report that firms limit their choice of research topics, require them to perform some work in return for the support, or require them to work for the supporting company after completing their training" (Gluck et al, 1997) . Feller (1990) argued:
Universities were no longer seeking, as they were just a few years ago, to maintain a distance between what may be termed "core" and "peripheral" activities in the search to commercialize faculty research. Proposals for universities to become aggressively involved in technological commercialization constitute change in that they affect the universities' "core" activities and norms, by directly affecting faculty research agendas. (p344)
Rosenberg and Nelson argued:
A shift in emphasis of university research toward more expensive connections with the needs of civilian industry can benefit industry and the universities if it is done in the right way. That way, in our view, is to respect the division of labor between universities and industry that has grown up with the development of the engineering disciplines and applied sciences, rather than one that attempts to draw universities deeply into a world in which decisions need to be made with respect to commercial criteria. There is no reason to believe that universities will function well in such an environment, and good reason to believe that such an environment will do damage to the legitimate functions of universities. On the other hand, binding university research closer to industry, while respecting the condition that research be 'basic' in the sense of aiming for understanding rather than short-run practical pay-off, can be to the enduring benefit of both." (p347) Moreover, of course, a whole host of technologically based industries, often global in nature, has emerged, replacing Britain's traditional industries. These new industries are marked by intensive R&D investment in-house, involving the effective "capture" of science within corporate structures.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW PRIVATE SCIENCE
As public and publicly funded science waned, and science and it knowledge product became commodified, so commercial organisations have stepped in to breach the gap. The following four case studies are now offered to illustrate how this process has resulted in the commodification of scientific knowledge and its exploitation for private commercial gain. Four major trends are discernible from the case studies, to differing degrees. They are: (a) role of accounting and finance controls in creating a paradigm shift in the way science is organised; (b) major changes in the universityindustry relationship particularly in the 1990s; (c) the impact of the attitude of state that "the industry knows what is best for increasing competitiveness and economic growth"; and (d) visible emergence of discontinuity in the trust and confidence between science and the public.
The Brent Spar
The Brent Spar was a North Sea oil facility owned by the Shell oil company that came into operation in 1976. Built before pipelines carried oil from the seabed wells to the shore, its function was to store crude oil and then offload it to tankers for onward transport. This 29-metre diameter vertical cylindrical structure had six vast tanks for storing oil. Iceberg-like in nature, it had a draft of 109 metres and a further 28 metres of the structure above water.
In 1977, two of the six tanks suffered pressure damage and they were left to fill with seawater. By 1978, a pipeline to the shore provided an alternative route for landing oil. By 1987, the costs of operating and maintaining the platform had escalated dramatically. In 1991, Shell took a financially based operating decision to decommission the Spar and the facility ceased operating.
Shell then commissioned a series of studies to evaluate disposal options. Because of its size, complexity and the toxic sludge that had accumulated in the tanks, disposal was certain to be an expensive and complex task.
Eventually, the decommissioning options were reduced to deep sea dumping or onshore dismantling. The cost estimates were £11.8 million for dumping and £46 million for dismantling. Various alternative onshore dismantling options were considered, but the company quickly began to lose interest because of the relatively high costs compared with dumping. Eventually it announced that, in the interests of balancing safety, environment and costs, deep water dumping was preferable (Shell Press Release, 16 February 1995) .
Shell was obliged to carry out detailed evaluations of onshore disposal to satisfy UK government requirements, but it appears that the company's heart was not in this process. Shell consistently reiterated that deep sea disposal was not only cheaper, but also safer and more environmentally friendly. Before applying for government approval for this plan, Shell commissioned a team at Aberdeen University (a major Scottish oil town) to study the disposal options. That study concluded that deep sea disposal was preferable under the Best Practicable Environmental Option requirements.
The Petroleum Act 1987 required Shell not only to consider all of the available options for disposal, but also to consult with fishing and environmental groups before the necessary licence could be granted by government. None of the many and various special interest groups protested and the government issued its licence in February 1995. The government was satisfied that national and international statutes and regulations had been complied with. In that sense, the process was faultless.
Whilst this process seems fair and transparent, it is worth pausing to reflect on the ownership of the knowledge used to make decisions. All the studies used by Shell were commissioned and paid for by Shell from specialists active in the marine engineering industry (where Shell is a powerful and influential customer). Particularly, Shell appears to have deployed the study by Aberdeen University to win legitimacy for its pre-determined actions. Neither the regulatory authorities nor the government undertook any independent study to evaluate the disposal options. As the debate unfolded, it became apparent that these studies presumed many things. Moreover, the various stakeholder groups consulted were unlikely to have had access to the requisite scientific expertise sufficient to challenge Shell with confidence.
In the summer of 1995 Shell started to make plans for dumping the Spar. It was then taken aback by the fury of public protest unleashed by Greenpeace, which occupied the Spar as it was being towed to its planned resting site. The three week occupation provided exciting TV footage, with Shell attempting to use water cannon to keep Greenpeace activists off and the final boarding of the structure by the police to evict the protesters after Shell had obtained a court order for repossession. One of the most successful aspects of the campaign was the generation of a consumer boycott of Shell petrol stations across Europe. This was so successful in Germany that sales fell by 50% and the German government eventually bowed to public pressure and lodged a protest at the disposal.
At the start of the campaign Greenpeace's knowledge about the Spar was very limited. This did not stop the group from making assertions about the sludge contained in the Spar. Instead, Greenpeace criticised the scientific methods used in the studies of disposal options and sought to utilise the advice from government scientists that the waste on board was such that there should be no shallow water disposal. Greenpeace reasoned that if something was too toxic for shallow water the same applied to deep water. The group also took issue with the case-by-case approach adopted by government to the granting of licences. They argued that there were a number of installations in the North Sea that might meet disposal regulatory requirements but that their cumulative environmental effects was what deserved active consideration. There were therefoe two main aspects of Greenpeace's case: that Shell's statements about the state and contents of the Brent Spar were incorrect and that the best practicable environmental option process was fundamentally flawed.
A flurry of scientific debate and costings arguments followed. Greenpeace's allegations over the structure and contents of the Spar were found to be incorrect by a new third party survey commissioned by Shell. Greenpeace later acknowledged that it had been wrong in its claims. In Greenpeace's favour, the United Kingdom Offshore Operators' Association (an industry body) commissioned a study from one of the same scientific consultants used by Shell to justify disposal at sea. That concluded that the best environmental option was onshore dismantling. This contradicted UKOOA's own previous position that disposal should be considered on a case by case basis rather than considering cumulative environmental damage.
Finally, the UK Energy Minister set up a "scientific group" to look at the implications of the Brent Spar's deep-sea disposal on the environment. This report again rejected the case-by-case approach and advocated looking at total cumulative environmental damage.
One of the major lessons learned by Shell during this process was that technocratic compliance with rationalistic scientific regulations was insufficient to provide public acceptability for the proposed dumping. In short, scientists employed by Shell to justify the decision to dump at sea, although producing ostensibly the right answers, failed to convince and satisfy. What was then generated was a wide ranging sciencebased public debate utilising the internet and the world's media to win the day.
Eventually, Shell embarked on a lengthy process of public consultation and debate over the ultimate fate of the Brent Spar. It was forced into this by commercial pressures from the lobbying undertaken by Greenpeace. It learned that compliance with the regulations was insufficient. During this process the Brent Spar was towed to a deep-water location off Norway.
The process embarked on by Shell under its Way Forward strategy was to hold an international engineering competition based on open and proactive communication and a series of dialogue events with interested stakeholders.
In the case of the Brent Spar, we see industrial use of scientific enquiry to justify a financially-driven decision. University researchers, hired by the company, were involved in this process, and might be seen as having a legitimising function.
Environmental groups, fisheries groups and the government lacked real access to independent scientific advice. The government especially was reliant upon industry financed scientific advice in satisfaction of regulatory requirements, with little or no independent verification. The use of a university to legitimise a decision combined with a lack of expertise outside the corporate realm enabled Greenpeace to stimulate indirect market influence over the firm through consumer power. Thus we see that financial and financial-market driven pressures can lead to a new public governance of science.
GM Foods and Monsanto
The original Monsanto Chemical Works were founded in 1901 by a self-educated chemist to produce saccharin. The company began a line of business in other food additives and in the ensuing 100 years it has developed product lines in aspirin, industrial chemicals, synthetic fibres, herbicides (including the infamous Agent Orange used in the Vietnam war as an exfoliant and the well-known Roundup herbicide) and, latterly, GM food crops. Controversies have frequently surrounded Monsanto's products. It was a major producer of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in the 1930s and has been accused of major pollution at its production sites. Similar controversies arose with its production of dioxin, a major ingredient of the Agent Orange produced for use in the Vietnam War. Monsanto has aggressively promoted its products. For instance, when a US Food and Drug Administration scientist, Richard Burroughs, accused Monsanto and the FDA of manipulating scientific data he was fired. When small dairy companies proposed advertising their products as free of BST, Monsanto threatened to sue.
Monsanto has always been an acquisitive company and rapidly grew into a major US and then global corporate presence. The company's involvement with GM foods began in 1981 when it forged links with Washington University in St Louis. It embarked on a programme of corporate acquisitions aimed at restructuring itself in the areas of life sciences, agriculture, pharmaceuticals and foods. Its first product to emerge from this process was bovine somatotropin (BST) (a genetically engineered growth promoter for cattle). This was followed by GM products such as RoundupReady soya beans, NewLeaf insect-protected potatoes, Bollgard insect-protected cotton and the delayed-ripening tomato. By 1996, Monsanto was operating in over 100 companies, had annual global sales of £6 billion and net earnings of £885 million. In 1997, the chemical aspects of the business were separated off into Solutia Inc to allow Monsanto to concentrate on its new chosen areas of business.
Monsanto is now a major global bio-technology firm. By 1998 it had annual sales of £8 billion and 25,000 employees (including 19,000 scientists). Foreign sales amount to 45% of that total. R&D expenditure is substantial at £1.26 billion in 1998 (or 15% of net sales) and this appears to have provided an imperative of speed in the commercialisation of research findings. The aggressive corporate acquisition polices of the firm were designed to ensure that Monsanto has access to the right skills and markets to progress in this field. However, by 1998 that had resulted in a loss of £250 million for the year largely due to restructuring costs.
The loss of the US patent for Roundup in 2000 made securing the company's financial future all the more imperative. Faced with competition from cheap generics, one way of ensuring continuing control of the markets was to develop Roundup ready seeds (which have a resistance to the herbicide) and then sell these only to farmers who agreed to buy Monsanto's herbicide (Lappe and Bailey, 1998) . To support this venture, Monsanto bought up rights to a number of genes; many developed by the US government, including those for so-called terminator technology. These technologies are engineered into seeds to ensure that the plants grown from them produce no fertile seeds-necessitating the return of the farmer to Monsanto for further seeds. In anticipation of this new technology (yet to be implemented) Monsanto continues to take an aggressive stance towards farmers who save seeds from their (Monsanto) crops to use the following year.
Monsanto has paid careful attention to building a network of relationships with all aspects of the US regulatory framework. The potential global value of this business, it has been alleged, means that the US government has been reluctant to intervene too strenuously (Ferrara, 1998) . Monsanto GM products are now licensed for unrestricted use in the US. In contrast, in the UK, the government has announced that it cannot envisage taking a decision on unrestricted use until 2002. In the US, use of these products is largely unregulated and GM products are treated as "natural" on the basis that the process of genetic engineering is an extension of the genetic breeding that breeders and horticulturalists have practice for hundreds of years (Ferrara, 1998) . In a US political environment adverse to regulation of business, Monsanto has thrived. Similarly, it has sought to foster tough regulatory regimes where these might act as a barrier to market entry by smaller firms.
It appears that close relationships between the company, the universities and government agencies, has enabled Monsanto to wield considerable influence over the regulatory regimes in the US. Successive administrations in Washington made hardly any attempt to regulate this field for the fear of stifling its global industrial competitiveness (Ferrara, 1998) . Lack of strong regulatory requirements reduced the need for independent research in the public domain and helped Monsanto's efforts to market its GM products before most of them were thoroughly tested. It appears that there are inadequate and even less credible regulatory systems in many other countries.
By 1996 some European companies had successfully introduced several GM food products into the UK, including vegetarian cheese (which has a genetically engineered replacement for rennet) and GM tomato paste. This and Monsanto's US operations may have led the company to believe that it would experience little or no difficulties with its GM products in Europe. There is an important distinction in that UK products can be segregated and labelled. US soya bean and corn in contrast is now banned from Europe by the EU because GM soya is freely mixed with non-GM beans. Producers argue that the cost of separating the beans and thereby enhancing consumer choice would be prohibitive. That is, the US products could not be separately identified and labelled, facilitating consumer choice (Durant et al, 1998) . Similarly, Monsanto's genetically modified bovine growth hormone rBGH is banned in the EU.
What is spectacular in the UK is the opposition to GM foods generated amongst consumers by campaigning lobby groups such as Greenpeace. Widespread consumer opposition to GM foods throughout 1998 and 1999 led government to introduce regulations demanding that shops and retail outlets declare the GM content of food sold. Supermarkets went one stage further and many have now announced a policy of their shops being GM free zones. The Government has given permission for trial GM crops, but these have been targeted by direct action campaigners. In 1998 Lord Melchett and a number of other Greenpeace members destroyed a GM crop by cutting it down and attempting to bag it. At both their subsequent trial for criminal damage and their retrial they were acquitted on the grounds that they were preventing damage to neighbouring crops (because of the risk of GM pollen spreading) and the livelihoods of the UK's organic farmers.
This backlash has had a dramatic effect on Monsanto itself. In response to market pressures it went through further major restructuring in late 1999. The company divested itself of a number of agri-science operations and merged with Pharmacia and Upjohn in order to concentrate on its pharmaceutical business. The new company, called Pharmacia has Monsanto as an "autonomous agricultural subsidiary". It seems likely that this restructuring was to relieve the pressure on Monsanto's share price following the GM controversy.
The Monsanto case is an explicit example of the commodification of scientific knowledge. In the case of GM foods we see a near total reliance by governments on the scientific evidence produced by the firms themselves. Firms such as Monsanto exhibit systematic control of the scientific process, both in universities and in smaller firms (which they control through acquisitions and market dominance). The scientific knowledge produced and deployed by Monsanto is the product of the US system and there are issues with the applicability and legitimacy of that knowledge in the context of the UK as a result. In a sense, global corporations bring globalised science with them. The US government has attempted to combat the EU ban on bovine growth hormones by deploying its own scientific arguments. And finally, whilst there is an absence of public scientific expertise, this has not prevented public opposition to the scientifically-legitimised arguments of Monsanto. Once again, as with the Brent Spar, we see the profound indirect market effects of the public lack of trust in commodified scientific knowledge. In this case, consumer refusals influenced stock market valuations leading to a major corporate restructuring.
British Biotech Plc
Recently, the impact of accounting and financial pressures on biotechnology firms that invest heavily in R&D appears to have been significant. A number of these firms have made premature claims to the financial markets about their new drugs in various stages of development, only to withdraw them later. For example, Cortecs, Celltech, and British Biotech made substantial claims about some of their drugs under development and raised high expectations in the share market in the mid-1990s. During 1996, shares in the bioscience sector rose by 36 per cent as result of favourable clinical results announced by leading firms (Business Week,1996) .
iii However, some of their drugs subsequently failed to pass clinical trials and their share prices crashed. In December 1998, after making exaggerated claims about its osteoporosis drug Macritonin, Cortecs had to admit that the drug was not as advanced as previously suggested. This resulted in a share price crash from nearly 200p in February 1998 to 11.5p by (Electronic Telegraph, 1998 British Biotech is one of the leading biotechnology companies in the UK. Since the late-1980s, it has invested heavily in R&D to develop pioneering drugs such as Zacutex (a drug for acute pancreatitis), Batimastat and Marimastat (both cancer treatments). Between 1996 and 1998, about 80 per cent of costs were incurred in R&D (British Biotech, 1998a). vi While the R&D expenditure increased to £42.2.m in 1997/98, the loss for the same period also increased to £44.9m (British Biotech, 1998b). vii Over the years, it appears that sustained heavy investment in R&D has increased accounting and financial pressures demanding short-term economic pay off, influencing the company's behaviour.
Between 1994 and 1998, British Biotech made several public statements indicating successful clinical trials of different drugs under development. This raised high expectations in the financial market and the value of the company soared dramatically during 1996-1997. In 1995, British Biotech announced promising test results for Zacutex and Marimastat. It also announced the establishment of commercial operations internationally, despite its lack of marketable products. These optimistic public announcements boosted its share price: within three days of presenting promising results from clinical trials of Marimastat in May 1996 at a major medical conference its market capitalisation surged from 1.3bn to nearly £3b. Following announcements that the drug would enter its final stage of clinical trials during that year, viii its share price increased to £33.15 from £4.95 the previous year (Electronic Telegraph,1996; Business Week, 1996) . Between May and September 1997, it announced optimistic results from clinical trials of Zacutex and Marimastat, linking that to statements that it would set up marketing and sales structure in Europe fror Zacutex.
ix However, by mid-1997, problems with clinical trials of Zacutex and Marimastat began to emerge. It subsequently abandoned the development of Zacutex and scaled down its expectations for Marimastat, "which was once considered a potential blockbuster" (Electronic Telegraph, 1998) x It also shelved plans for an international sales operation. British Biotech's shares subsequently lost two thirds of their value.
The problems faced by the biotechnology industry in general and the British Biotech in particular, led to serious government concerns. In August 1998, the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee published a report on British Biotech (after questioning both the company and representatives of the London Stock exchange) (Select Committee on Science and Technology, HC 888). Although not criticising the company directly, the report encouraged the BioIndustry Association to announce the formulation of a voluntary code for the sector with regard to the proper disclosure of information on their products and those under development (Select Committee on Science and Technology, HC 535).
This example demonstrates the usage of clearly commodified scientific knowledge in a capital market environment. The evidence suggests that commodified scientific knowledge is misused as a result of financial imperatives. Moreover, bo the government and the financial markets are in a poor position to accurately judge the claims made by such firms in possession of scientific expertise.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper has a clear central thesis. This is that science in the UK has been virtually or actually relocated from its own independent realm to either a marketised public sector or the private sector by means of a process of commodification of the knowledge product of science. That process of commodification was rendered possible by the deployment of accounting technology.
We have demonstrated how science developed in a distinct socio-economic location in the UK up until 1979. Generously funded by the state, it was nevertheless not subject to the more usual of accounting controls. The rationale for this was that science was not amenable to such controls because of its inherent nature. It is possible to argue that science was not amenable to such controls simply because, as a social practice, it had developed outside of market/industrial/commercial pressures and controls. We argue that the subsequent imposition of accounting controls, combined with the desire of a number of industries to develop as knowledge-based industries has led to radical change with regard to the commodification of scientific knowledge and the capture of scientific practice by marketised or market based institutions.
This change has had the profound effect of generating public unease with scientific knowledge. No longer in possession of its impartial and independent status, science is now often construed as a legitimizing tool of economic and policy making powers. This suggests to us that the impartiality and objectivity of science depends as much on the location and status of the practice as it does upon the execution of scientific work itself at the level of the laboratory bench.
Finally, and in an interesting twist to this story, it may be that accounting, finance and market pressures may create new avenues for public control over scientific practice and knowledge. Our case studies demonstrate that often it is market forces that can generate the best systems of accountability and control. Of late, direct action campaigning groups have been utilizing this as a campaign mechanism. For instance, the campaign by animal rights activists against Huntingdon Life Sciences, an animal testing facility, has enjoyed considerable success by taking dfirect action against the financial backers of the company.
